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Getting Too Little Medical Care May be the Greatest Threat to Patient Safety
Rodney A. Hayward, MD,1,2 Steven M. Asch, MD, MPH,3 Mary M. Hogan, PhD, RN,1
Timothy P. Hofer, MD, MSc,1,2 Eve A. Kerr, MD, MPH1,2
1Veterans Affairs Health Services Research & Development Center of Excellence, Ann Arbor, Mich, USA; 2Department of Internal
Medicine, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich, USA; 3Veterans Affairs Greater Los Angeles Health Care System and the Division of
General Internal Medicine, David Geffen School of Medicine at UCLA, Los Angeles CA, and the Rand Health Program,
Santa Monica, Calif, USA.
BACKGROUND: Little is known about the relative incidence of serious
errors of omission versus errors of commission.
OBJECTIVE: To identify the most common substantive medical errors
identified by medical record review.
DESIGN: Retrospective cohort study.
SETTING: Twelve Veterans Affairs health care systems in 2 regions.
PARTICIPANTS: Stratified random sample of 621 patients receiving
care over a 2-year period.
MAIN OUTCOME MEASURE: Classification of reported quality
problems.
METHODS: Trained physicians reviewed the full inpatient and outpa-
tient record and described quality problems, which were then classified
as errors of omission versus commission.
RESULTS: Eighty-two percent of patients had at least 1 error reported
over a 13-month period. The average number of errors reported per case
was 4.7 (95% confidence intervals [CI]: 4.4, 5.0). Overall, 95.7% (95% CI:
94.9%, 96.4%) of errors were identified as being problems with under-
use. Inadequate care for people with chronic illnesses was particularly
common. Among errors of omission, obtaining insufficient information
from histories and physicals (25.3%), inadequacies in diagnostic testing
(33.9%), and patients not receiving needed medications (20.7%) were all
common. Out of the 2,917 errors identified, only 27 were rated as being
highly serious, and 26 (96%) of these were errors of omission.
CONCLUSIONS: While preventing iatrogenic injury resulting from
medical errors is a critically important part of quality improvement,
we found that the overwhelming majority of substantive medical errors
identifiable from the medical record were related to people getting too
little medical care, especially for those with chronic medical conditions.
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P eople appear to have a natural tendency to be much moredisturbed by injury caused by acts of commission com-
pared with injury caused by acts of omission, a phenomenon
often referred to as ‘‘omission bias.’’1–4 For example, people
tend to view a death resulting from a vaccine as much worse
than a death resulting from not getting vaccinated.5,6 Perhaps
this psychologic phenomenon, in part, underlies why the pa-
tient safety movement has so strikingly caught the attention of
the public and media.7–12 Patient safety, with its emphasis on
iatrogenic injury resulting from medical errors,7–12 has gar-
nered widespread attention that greatly exceeds that generat-
ed by traditional, long-standing discussions of quality of care,
with its emphasis on optimizing care and outcomes.13–15
Although iatrogenic harm is always distressing, research
to date suggests that the majority of such injuries are not pre-
ventable, but instead appear to result from inherent risks and
limitations of medical care.16–20 In addition, the last 15 to 20
years have witnessed an explosion of valuable medical inter-
ventions (e.g., improvements in care for heart disease, HIV, di-
abetes, depression, hypertension, cancer prevention, etc.),15
and virtually all of these valuable interventions carry a meas-
urable risk of iatrogenic adverse events even when provided
under optimal circumstances. Therefore, although the risk of
iatrogenic harm resulting from misapplications or mistakes in
using the ever-growing number of medical treatments (errors
of commission) has increased, so has the potential to cause
serious injury and death from inadequate treatment (errors of
omission) 15,21–23 (see Fig. 1 and Table 1).
Although scholarly work on patient safety clearly includes
an appreciation for both errors of omission and commission,
discussions of safety problems, especially those aimed at the
general public, have overwhelmingly highlighted preventable
iatrogenic injury.7–12,18 Even in the scholarly patient safety
literature, little attention has been given to the relative inci-
dence of errors of omission versus commission.7–12 We can
find no rigorous peer evaluations of the relative number of
major errors of omission versus errors of commission in a rep-
resentative sample that evaluated both inpatient and outpa-
tient care. Therefore, we conducted a systematic longitudinal
review of medical records to examine this issue.
METHODS
Study Sample and Data Collection
A stratified random sample of patients who had at least 2 out-
patient primary care visits in each of 2 years was drawn from
12 Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health care systems in
2 regional health care networks (Midwest and Western U.S.)
that care for over 400,000 people annually. We oversampled 2
chronic medical conditions (diabetes and COPD) to obtain a
minimum of 175 cases for each condition. We reviewed 621
cases, with 10% undergoing blinded, independent duplicate
reviews to determine inter-rater reliability. We requested all
records for each patient for a 2-year time period, inpatient and
outpatient, but evaluation of quality was limited to a 13-month
period.
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Review Process
Reviewers were required to be board-certified Internists with
current or recent outpatient and inpatient experience as well
as being conversant with the principles of evidence-based
medicine. For each condition evaluated, reviewers assessed
the quality of care related to diagnosis and assessment of the
condition’s initial presentation, the assessment and monitor-
ing of the course of the condition, the treatment of signs or
symptoms, exacerbations or complications, and follow-up.
They then provided a rating of the quality of care on a 6-point
scale (ranging from ‘‘very good’’ to ‘‘very poor’’). The structured
review process specifically cued them to consider the impor-
tance of any overuse, underuse, or misuse quality problems,
and reviewers were warned against hindsight bias.22–25 Final-
ly, for any care that they rated as ‘‘borderline poor,’’ ‘‘poor,’’ or
‘‘very poor,’’ the reviewers wrote a description of the quality
problem/error.
Reviewers were able to scan available records for the 11
months prior to the study period, but their review was restrict-
ed to rating the care provided during the 13-month study pe-
riod (September 1, 1998 to September 30, 1999). The inter-
rater reliability (IRR) for the implicit assessments of overall
quality varied for different conditions and for different aspects
of care but was consistently as good or better than those re-
ported for other implicit review tools (intra-class correlation
ranged from 0.16 to 0.46).19,26,27
Design and Analysis of the Classification of Errors
After reviewing previously proposed classification sys-
tems,7,15,17,20,28–31 we chose 3 overarching domains for clas-
sifying errors: (1) overuse/underuse/misuse, (2) care function
(i.e., diagnosis, treatment), and (3) care modality (i.e., history,
physical exam, laboratory test, medication). Pilot testing found
that reviewers’ verbatim descriptions could be easily divided
into errors of commission versus omission, but that it was of-
ten difficult or impossible to distinguish between misuse and
overuse based on the reviewers’ verbatim comments. There-
fore, we limited this assessment to underuse versus overuse/
misuse.
Two physician reviewers not involved in the original re-
views independently classified discrete error descriptions using
the previously described taxonomy (see Appendix, available on-
line). Reviewers were also asked to denote errors that they felt
were particularly serious (defined by the degree to which the
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been prevented by optimal care)
FIGURE 1. Errors of commission and errors of omission.
Table 1. Glossary: Terminology Can Vary Substantially in This Field
Term Definition
Medical error An act of commission or omission that substantively increases the risk of a medical adverse event. Errors
can result from the failure of a planned action to be completed as intended (i.e., a mishap or error of
execution) or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim (i.e., an error of planning).
Quality problem, or poor quality (See Medical error)
Error of commission A medical error resulting in an inappropriate increased risk of iatrogenic adverse event(s) from receiving too
much or hazardous treatment (overuse or misuse). Errors of commission include quality problems such
as excessive doses of medications, treatments that are contraindicated, inadvertently giving the wrong
medication, or iatrogenic risk resulting from unneeded interventions.
Overuse/misuse When a test or treatment is offered or provided, intentionally or unintentionally, that has iatrogenic risks
that outweigh its potential benefits, for example, performing a surgery that was not indicated, giving an
inappropriately high dose of a medication, or giving a patient who needs an antibiotic amoxicillin
despite them having a known penicillin allergy.
Error of omission A medical error resulting in an inappropriate increased risk of disease-related adverse event(s) resulting
from receiving too little treatment (underuse). Errors of omission include quality problems such as
delays in diagnosis, subtherapeutic doses of medications, and failure to provide indicated treatments.
Underuse When there is a failure to recommend or provide a beneficial procedure, therapy, or diagnostic test,
intentionally or unintentionally, for example, not providing medication to control hypertension for a
patient who could benefit from treatment or a delay in treatment caused by a delay in making the
correct diagnosis.
Medical adverse event A medical injury or complication. Adverse events can occur despite appropriate care (such as recognized
complications of an intervention or resulting from the person’s underlying disease) or can be caused by
errors of omission or commission.
Iatrogenic medical adverse event An adverse event caused by a medical intervention. Iatrogenic adverse events can be caused by appropriate
care (recognized risks of treatment such as known complications of procedures or side-effects of
medications) or caused by errors of commission.
Disease-related adverse event An adverse event resulting from a medical condition (i.e., a disease complication). Disease-related adverse
events can occur despite appropriate care or can be caused by errors of omission (resulting from
underuse of indicated medical interventions).
The following definitions clarify what we mean by each term, and further discussion of this topic can be found elsewhere.21–23
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blinded, independent ratings of the 2 reviewers’ disagreed with
each other (1,038 [11.7%] out of 8,838 total classification deci-
sions on function, modality, and care problem made on 2,946
discrete error descriptions), a third reviewer (M. H.) reviewed the
verbatim response. Her rating settled the tie when she felt that
one reviewer’s assessment was clearly correct (n=886). In a few
instances (n=16), she felt that neither reviewer answer was
correct. In such cases, a group review was conducted (usually
resulting in a classification of ‘‘unclear/insufficient informa-
tion’’). If she felt that either answer was reasonable (i.e., difficult
or close calls) (n=136), the disagreement between reviewers
was settled by random assignment (to prevent the third review-
er from introducing bias by systematically deciding ‘‘close
calls’’).32 Some verbatim descriptions (n=29) did not identify
a medical error and were dropped, leaving 2,917 items for anal-
ysis. The reliability for classifying verbatim responses was high:
overuse/misuse versus underuse (k=0.75), care function
(k=0.79), and core modality (k=0.81).
Data Analysis
Analyses primarily involved descriptive statistics. After classi-
fying verbatim descriptions of reviewers’ comments, as de-
scribed above, we calculated the frequencies, percentages,
and 95% confidence intervals (CI) for the various types of er-
rors, correcting for clustering (by patient and site) and design
effects (over-sampling) using the Stata 8.0 statistical package
(StataCorp, College Station, TX).
RESULTS
Of the 621 cases, 82% had at least some care that was con-
sidered ‘‘borderline poor’’ or worse (Table 2), with an average of
4.7 (95% CI, 4.4, 5.0) discrete errors identified per case. Of the
specific conditions, diabetes care had the highest reported er-
ror rate (1.7 per diabetes case) and acute conditions had the
lowest (0.6 errors per acute condition case). Of errors that
could be classified (36 descriptions were rated ‘‘unclear/not
classifiable’’), 95.7% (95% CI, 94.9% to 96.4%) were classified
as underuse and 4.3% (95% CI, 3.6% to 5.1%) as overuse/
misuse. For the 4 chronic conditions, 4% of errors were caused
by overuse/misuse, whereas 14% of errors for acute condition
care were caused by overuse/misuse. However, this higher
relative frequency of overuse problems was not caused by a
higher absolute frequency of overuse errors for acute condition
care, but rather, the care for acute conditions had a much
lower frequency of underuse errors. For example, the 621 cas-
es averaged 0.13 overuse/misuse errors per case and 2.85
underuse errors per case related to chronic disease care, com-
pared with 0.09 overuse/misuse errors per case and 0.54 un-
deruse errors per case for acute care in the 409 cases with an
acute condition.
With regard to errors of omission, over half the problems
identified were classified as related to diagnosis and monitor-
ing, with about one third related to treatment (Table 3). Ob-
taining insufficient information from histories and physicals
(25.3%), inadequacies in diagnostic testing (33.9%), and
patient not receiving needed medications (20.7%) were all com-
monly reported problems. Examples of insufficient informa-
tion from histories and physicals include a patient with facial
weakness without further documented neurologic examina-
tion and a patient with lower extremity edema and no cardiac
examination recorded. Examples of inadequacies in diagnostic
testing include a patient with known coronary artery disease
and new onset chest pain who received no stress testing, and a
patient who presented with night sweats but received no chest
x-ray or ppd. Some examples of not providing needed medica-
tions include a patient with a previous lacunar stroke who was
not on an anti-platelet agent, and a patient with type 2 diabe-
tes who had no medication changes despite marked and re-
peated elevations of blood pressure. Additional examples can
be found in the Appendix.
We were concerned that although underuse errors may be
much more common overall, perhaps overuse/misuse errors
make up a disproportionate percentage of the most serious
medical errors. However, this was not the case. The reviewers
only rated 27 of the 2,917 identified errors as being particu-
larly serious, and only 1 of these errors (3.7%) was an error of
commission, which involved giving simvastatin to a patient
with a reported allergy to statins. Of the remaining 26 major
errors, multiple instances were reported for inadequate as-
sessment for or treatment of coronary artery disease (n=14),
marked hypertension (n=3), thrombotic risk (n=3), cardiac
arrhythmias (n=2), and hyperkalemia (n=2).
CONCLUSIONS
A dedication to safety is a critically important responsibility of
any industry.7 However, when providing air transportation or


























Hypertension 500 246 (49%) 464 (0.9) 429 (94.5) 25 (5.5) 10
COPD 167 90 (54%) 227 (1.4) 216 (96.4) 8 (3.6) 3
Diabetes 258 149 (58%) 427 (1.7) 411 (97.9) 9 (2.1) 7
Other chronic diseases 614 294 (48%) 758 (1.2) 712 (95.2) 36 (4.8) 10
Acute conditions 409 142 (35%) 259 (0.6) 221 (86.0) 36 (14.0) 2
Prevention 621 357 (57%) 782 (1.3) 767 (98.6) 11 (1.4) 4
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selling kitchen appliances, consumer safety is generally limited
to considerations of the risks related to using the service or
product, whereas, improving consumer safety in medicine re-
quires assessing, and often balancing, the potential harm of
inappropriate non-intervention (errors of omission), as well as
inappropriate or unsafe intervention (errors of commission)
(Fig. 1). In this way, medicine has more in common with the
military or law enforcement, in that the risks of friendly fire and
intervening too early or too much must be weighed against the
risks of enemy fire and intervening too slowly or insufficiently.
Although iatrogenic adverse events are sometimes talked
about as if they are synonymous with medical errors, increas-
ing a patient’s risk of iatrogenic adverse events will often be the
right thing to do.21–23 For example, underuse of thrombolytics,
anti-platelet agents, and anticoagulants are common causes of
preventable morbidity and mortality.15,33,34 However, appro-
priate use of these medications clearly and substantially in-
creases iatrogenic adverse events even when done optimally.
Of course, misapplications or mishaps in the use of medical
interventions can result in iatrogenic injuries that are truly
appalling.7,12 Therefore, discussions and considerations of ad-
verse events, patient safety, and medical errors must always
consider the appropriateness of medical intervention at the
time the decision was made,23,35 to try and avoid second-
guessing influenced by hindsight and omission bias.25
To our knowledge, our study is the first systematic exam-
ination of the balance between substantive errors of omission
versus commission using a detailed peer evaluation of both the
inpatient and outpatient medical record. We found that the
vast majority of medical errors noted by trained reviewers were
related to errors of omission. This finding was consistent
across a variety of conditions and was equally true when lim-
iting review to those errors that were felt to be the most serious.
Many experts have decried the inadequacies of our health care
system for taking care of those with chronic illnesses,15,36 and
insufficient care for people with chronic illness was particu-
larly prominent in our study. For example, there were over 3
times more substantive errors of omission related to diabetes
care than there were errors of commission related to all con-
ditions combined in the entire patient sample.
Some previous research has examined errors of omission
and commission in the inpatient setting17,20,29 or using explicit
review criteria.31,37 Although anecdotes of mishaps causing
iatrogenic complications tend to be highlighted in most discus-
sions of medical errors, a careful reading of past studies reveals
that our results are not that dissimilar from results found in
inpatient settings. Evaluations of inpatient errors have con-
sistently found that at least half of major adverse events re-
portedly resulting from medical errors were related to
underuse.17,20,29 For example, the Utah–Colorado Study (UT-
COS) found that for inpatient care, excluding adverse events
related to neonatal care and patient falls, permanent disability
and death were almost 3 times more likely to be caused by un-
deruse errors than overuse/misuse errors.17 Still, our study
found an even greater preponderance of underuse errors than
previous studies, and we believe that there are several potential
reasons for this finding. First, most previous studies mainly or
solely examined errors in hospital care, where errors of com-
mission might be relatively more common.17,20,29 Second, most
previous studies sampled adverse events and then worked
backward to find errors. Such retrospective, unblinded reviews
may overestimate errors of commission because even experts
are highly subject to hindsight and omission bias.1–5,24,38 On
the other hand, it also seems likely that the occurrence of ad-
verse events might increase documentation of otherwise unde-
tectable overuse/misuse errors. Third, the number of errors of
omission may have increased since the studies conducted in
the 1980s and the early 1990s. As the number of treatments
known to produce benefit has increased and cost containment
efforts have favored less use, the percentage of errors resulting
from undertreatment may also have increased. For example,
using an explicit review instrument, McGlynn et al.31 found
that patients failed to receive nearly 50% of indicated care.
Our findings are limited to 12 VA health care facilities,
and therefore our estimates of underuse versus overuse/mis-
use should not be overly generalized to other settings. Howev-
er, we think it likely that the general finding is not limited to VA
facilities. Indeed, both overall quality and receipt of recom-
mended care have generally been reported to be as good or
better in VA than in other sectors of the US health care sys-
tem.39–41 A more major and inherent limitation of our study is
its reliance on the medical record. Medical errors are frequent-
ly not identifiable from the medical record;18,42,43 however,
most of the albeit limited information on this topic has not
found major differences in the types of errors found in the
medical record versus patient or medical personnel re-
ports.18,42,44 In addition, the VA medical record system has
been found to be fairly reliable in accessing quality.45 Still, it
Table 3. Attributes of Errors of Omission
Delays or Insufficiencies in Care Frequency Percent (% of Classifiable Errors) 95% Confidence Intervals
Care function N=2,756
Diagnosis/assessment/monitoring 1471 53.5 51.5, 55.8
Treatment 919 33.4 30.8, 35.9
Prevention/screening 360 13.1 10.6, 15.6
Unclear/not specified 6 –
Clinical modality
History and exam 523 25.3 22.9, 27.7
Diagnostic testing 701 33.9 31.5, 36.3
Medications 427 20.7 17.7, 23.6
Immunizations 203 9.8 7.1, 12.6
Education/counseling 109 5.3 3.9, 6.6
Surgery/procedures/therapy 13 0.6 0.3, 0.9
Visit interval/referral/admission 90 4.4 3.2, 5.4
Unclear/not specified 690 –
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may be that overuse/misuse errors are much more difficult to
detect by medical record review than underuse errors and
quality related to technical skill (such as how well a procedure
or surgery is performed) is virtually impossible to glean from
the medical record. Therefore, our results must be qualified as
only pertaining to the types of medical errors that can be de-
tected from medical record review.
What are the implications of our findings? These results
clearly show that the attention given to patient safety is well
deserved, but also suggests that some portrayals of the nature
of the problem may be misleading. A detailed understanding of
the overall incidence and importance of errors of omission ver-
sus commission can be critical when trying to improve the ef-
fectiveness, efficiency, and safety of health care.23,46–48 Many
of the system solutions being pursued by patient safety and
human factors experts7,15 clearly have the promise of sub-
stantially reducing both types of errors and our findings create
a stronger case for such safety systems. For example, improv-
ing communication between providers, enhancing information
availability, and the use of electronic alerts, reminders, and
order entry7,15,22 all have direct relevance to reducing errors of
commission and errors of omission. However, we risk over-
looking important opportunities for designing these systems to
optimally improve patient safety if we fail to understand the
incidence and full importance of errors of omission.
Further, some proposed safety interventions either direct-
ly or indirectly present risks of increasing underuse (such as
redundancy systems, compulsory order renewals, mandatory
referrals, drug interaction alerts, and pre-authorization). In
such instances, our appropriate abhorrence for iatrogenic in-
juries can lead us to bad decisions if we fail to reflect upon the
incidence and relative importance of errors of omission versus
commission for the specific situation under consideration.
This is another instance in which health care can learn from
safety efforts in other industries.49–52 For example, when 4
people died in a British rail accident in 2000, the rail authority
reduced maximum allowable rail speeds, which was felt to
subsequently contribute to substantial reductions in rail trav-
el—resulting in increased auto deaths, economic losses, and
pollution.52 Similarly, an intemperate response to tragic iatro-
genic blunders can do more harm than good or result in the
diversion of scarce resources from more important, and fixa-
ble, health care problems. For example, tunnel vision in trying
to eliminate drug-drug interactions could lead to ‘‘safety sys-
tems’’ that inadvertently increase patient injury. One of us
(R. H.) recently received a pharmacy alert warning that one of
his patients was on both aspirin and lisinopril (which have a
known drug–drug interaction). However, the risk of aspirin–
ACE–inhibitor interactions (though possible with high doses of
salicylates) is trivial compared to the thousands of major adverse
events and deaths occurring each year resulting from underuse
of these medications.15,34,53–55 Even very small reductions in the
use of these life-saving medications in response to such well-
meaning alerts would far outweigh any potential benefits.
In summary, we found that over 95% of medical errors
identified in a review of patients’ medical records were caused
by patients receiving too little medical care. These results are
limited to errors that can be detected by medical record review;
nonetheless, they clearly demonstrate that patient safety and
quality improvement efforts must carefully reflect upon trans-
gressions related to those things we do and those things we fail
to do. Although deserved attention has been directed to iatro-
genic harm resulting from medical blunders, research to date
suggests that underuse of needed treatments is probably the
greatest risk to patient safety.
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